This study examines the governance attributes of post-IPO (initial public offering) retained ownership of private equity in business group constituent firms in contrast to their unaffiliated counterparts, in 202 newly listed firms in 22 emerging African economies. We adopt an actor centred institutional-theoretic perspective in rationalizing institutional voids and the advantages of maintained governance by both business angels (BA) and venture capital (VC) private equity. Our findings reveal private equity retain higher post-IPO ownership in business group constituents compared to unaffiliated firms and that this is inversely moderated in the context of improving institutional quality. Our result adds to the literature on multifocal corporate governance mechanisms.
Introduction
Business groups are hybrid organizational forms comprised of a number of nominally independent firms. These firms are intrinsically bound together through a range of "hard" ownership-based control mechanisms (e.g. concentrated voting rights) and "soft" socialization measures (e.g. clan and familial affiliation of top management), where business group constituent firms collectively adhere to common group-wide strategies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) . Business groups are prevalent in emerging markets, as well as in a majority of developed economies, although notably absent from market-orientated economies such as US and UK (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001 ). Despite the importance of business groups in emerging markets there is a lack of literature on business group expansion; specifically on how the constraints of a limited internal capital market necessitate external capital infusions by predominantly private equity (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001) .
In this paper we analyse the interplay between the institutional context and the corporate governance role of private equity retained ownership in a post-IPO (initial public offering) business group structures. By developing a new comprehensive institutional-theoretic approach we address the role of formal institutions on the conduct of firms based in Africa. We argue that Africa is a particular rich research context given the exceptionally high variation in institutionally quality across the continent, with this ranging from the weakest formal institutions worldwide (Transparency International, 2014) to some national governance frameworks being on a par with Western Europe (see Hearn & Piesse, 2013; Hearn, 2014) .
Prior research has emphasised that one of the main advantages of business groups in emerging economies is their ability to mitigate institutional voids (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007) . The vulnerability of firms to such institutional voids can be reduced by forming business groups with internally coordinated group-wide managerial labour, product and capital markets, paralleled by accentuated control across the group. The functioning of such internalized markets is underscored by extensive socialized control amongst group constituents (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001 ). Socialized control commonly reflects powerful underlying sociological traits within indigenous society, such as familial or clan affiliation, and provide a different rationale for group formation rivalling conventional arguments based on institutional voids. This is further exemplified by the often intractable nature of powerful family groups within state institutional architecture, prevalent to many emerging economies (Claessens et al., 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Khanna & Palepu, 2000) and the prevalence of business groups in high institutional quality contexts in Asia (e.g. Khanna & Yafeh, 2007) and Middle East and North Africa (Hearn, 2014) . Thus private equity investment into group constituent firms must contend with the complex socialized control over the group by the controlling owner alongside opaque formal institutions offering protection of property rights.
We contribute to the nascent comparative corporate governance literature (see Aguilera & Jackson, 2003 , 2010 in developing an actor-centred institutional-theoretic perspective regarding the interaction between outside private equity and controlling business group entities within focal IPO firms 1 . Our perspective is particularly useful in rationalizing the co-existence of multiple governance frameworks within a single national context. This implies what we use theoretical concepts such as institutional path dependence (see North, 1990 North, , 1994 and mutually reinforcing complementarities (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1994; Aoki, 2001 ). The perspective is also particularly applicable in Africa where European-colonial transplanted formal institutions are often incongruous with informal institutions rooted on feudal clan-based political economies -eschewing collectivism and communitarian notions as well as religious norms based on egalitarianism and uniformity. The framework provides our theoretical basis for evaluating the corporate governance options available to private equity post-IPO. Such corporate governance options are typically a trade-off between higher retained ownership -leading to more intrusive social participation within the business group constituent firm -or alternatively a greater reliance on state-level institutional architecture through lower ownership and consequently higher reliance on legally mandated performance covenants. The trade-off between these two alternatives centres on transactions costs 1 Such an actor-centred perspective encompasses the institutional formal versus informal dichotomy of North (1990 North ( , 1994 , elements of Williamson's (1998 Williamson's ( , 2000 transaction cost economics -itself an offshoot of the institutional literature, and notions of isomorphic conformity in organizational structure of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) . These provide the basis of nascent comparative corporate governance literature of Aguilera and Jackson (2003) .
-themselves a function of the differences in bounded rationality between outside private equity and dominant business group controlling entity where these are shaped by institutions.
Using a unique hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 202 IPOs undertaken across
Africa from January 2000 to January 2014 we find empirical support for our hypotheses that private equity post-IPO ownership is higher in business group constituent firms than in their unaffiliated counterparts. This association is inversely moderated by institutional quality. We also explicitly control for possible endogeneity of private equity's retained ownership through the unique employment of instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology that takes account of endogenous covariates through a distinct two-step estimation procedure. Few prior studies control for such endogeneity, and while methods remedying this issue are usually restricted in emerging economy research by data constraints, our study sets a new benchmark in this respect.
The rest of this paper is organized in six sections. In the next section below, we outline the theoretical justification behind our study and hypotheses. In the section thereafter we provide an overview of African stock markets, private equity and institutional frameworks, followed by a section in which we outline the data. Next we define the variables used in study and the modelling techniques. In a further section, we discuss the empirical findings. In the closing section, we summarise the key findings and discuss the implications and the limitations of the study.
Theory and hypotheses
While business groups are constellations of firms under the control of a dominant entity -usually a family but also state, banks (e.g. Japanese keiretsu), corporate, informal or individual interests -all subordinate firms commonly adhere to a joint group-wide strategy (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) . The extended group is a hybrid organizational structure -where its coordinated strategy between constituents infers it falls outside the classical boundary of the firm yet within the scope of unhindered markets (Williamson, 2000) . In past literature the main arguments rationalizing the formation of business groups are based on deficiencies in state-level financial and legal architecture and/or a weak institutional environment leading to prohibitive transactions costs (Williamson, 1998 (Williamson, , 2000 . Such weaknesses commonly arise from a lack of efficient intermediaries in external markets for products, labour and capital (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007) . This leads to a necessity in internalising the intermediation function of these markets through a better-performing group-wide resource coordination system.
Emerging economy business groups are typically diversified across industries and attract a market valuation premium for this -where the opposite would be true for such diversification in developed economies (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007) . This additionally assists business groups in attaining geographical and industry risk diversification -where sector concentration otherwise renders firms vulnerable to the significant macroeconomic and policy instability ubiquitous to many emerging economies. Such diversification in cash flow streams also contributes to a group-wide income smoothing and to a more efficient allocation of the group-based internal capital markets.
Past research (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) indicates that religious and familial altruism can provide the social "glue" binding the business group members together, as these institutions employ socialized control mechanisms across the wider group. This "glue" is also
shown by the fact that within the business group there is commonly a complex managerial coordination system -with resource allocation being made in accordance to social status and within-group institutionalized rules of action (Ocasio, 1999) . The institutionalized nature of this social cohesion promotes trust between group members, enhancing group-based social capital. The institutional-theoretic argument above rationalizes business group formation in terms of networksbased trust that helps to circumvent institutional voids. This argument based on institutional complementarities (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) alludes to broader mutually reinforcing institutional elements (Millgrom & Roberts, 1994; Aoki, 2001 ) that originate from the deeper societal matrix.
Overall the institutional perspective places considerable emphasis on the inherent social nature of business groups.
In order to enhance the efficiencies associated with resource provision in internal capital markets, business groups often take over and internalize a specialized financial services firm, such as a commercial bank or VC entity (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) . Business group expansion -either through additional diversification of activities or calving i.e. the formation of subordinate founderled groups from within the parent group structure -stretches financial resources and necessitates the raising of outside private equity capital. Group-constituent firms are in a particularly strategically advantageous position in being able to leverage on the wider group reputation or brand in facilitating trust and to attract external investment (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) . Trust is instrumental in their attainment of credibility in contracting (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001 ).
The access to external private equity investors is essential for capital infusions to augment provision by internal markets.
A critical dimension in capital market intermediation is the intertemporal dimension of investment, which draws on the relative longevity of investment time horizons of actors. Large extended family entities -particularly in emerging economies with minimal, if any, state social welfare provision (Levy, 2008) -are largely motivated by intergenerational transfer of capital.
Thus in diversified groups investment horizons associated with internal capital markets may be significantly longer in focussing on long-term value and the social significance of a constituent firm's operations than those of outside private equity investors. The longer horizons are especially prominent in the operations of group-wide internal markets, where a combination of investment over multiple periods and shareholder tunnelling appear together with mechanisms such as transfer pricing and expropriation used to redistribute capital around group members (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 , Claessens et al., 1999 , 2000 . Hence, conflicts of interest may occur with the shorter-time horizons associated with profit-motivated external investors -such as private equity. Furthermore they are also associated with expropriation. Differences of time horizon preferences between investor groups underscore the considerable moral hazard costs associated with external principals infusing capital into group-constituent firms. These costs being encompassed within broader transactions costs associated with differences in bounded rationality between group members and outsiders may lead to "conflicting voices" within the organization (Hoskisson et al., 2002) .
The inherent differences in institutional environment -within which business group constituent firms and external private equity entities are socially embedded -are reflected in different degrees of bounded rationality of these actors (Hoskisson et al., 2002) . While this encompasses moral hazard risks it also encapsulates levels of opportunism and the intendedly rational nature of actors -where this rationality is distinctively shaped by the respective indigenous institutional frameworks (Williamson, 1998) . Such differences in bounded rationality between actors generate transactions costs -where the mitigation of these places a central emphasis on expost governance structure (Williamson, 1998 (Williamson, , 2000 . Thus at an IPO there is an important choice between private equity's elevated retained ownership and intrusive social participation (see Bruton et al., 2010) within business groups, on the one hand, and a reduction in ownership and greater reliance on performance-based contracts and covenants, on the other (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers & Lerner, 1996) . This view forms the basis of our theoretical model of the interaction between private equity and business group constituent firms.
Business groups and institutions in emerging economies
We argue that while there is a strong rationale for the institutional void arguments in relation to the functioning of business groups, there are equally strong socio-cognitive arguments relating to the formation of such groups. Last-mentioned arguments are particularly pertinent in underscoring the extended social system and inter-relationships amongst group-members that underpins the efficiency of the internal resource coordination system. They also shape the distinctive bounded rationality of business group constituent actors -thereby defining transactions costs and related moral hazard with respect to outside investor principals such as private equity.
A distinctive characteristic of many emerging economies is the incongruity -or lack of fitbetween formal institutional frameworks and their informal counterparts. La Porta et al (1998 Porta et al ( , 2000 attest this to the transplantation of European institutional frameworks during the colonial era -where this occurred either through colonial (military) conquest or through notions of adopting the then "international best practice". Often the institutional frameworks transplanted were narrow and restricted to those governance frameworks to engender control by colonial metropole and facilitate colonial trade arrangements. These had to contend with pre-existing indigenous societal matrices rooted on clan-based feudal political economies with associated governance centred on collectivist and communitarian ideals. This is particularly true in the light that the indigenous "….African society is a system of mutually benefiting reciprocities" through which exchange within extended families takes place (Otite, 1978: 10 quoted in Darley & Blankson, 2008: 377) . Further complexity arises from religious institutions, where these are typically Islamic shari'ya and Ubuntu philosophy in African societies. These are egalitarian in nature and emphasising uniformity across clan and familial divides within society. However their moral prescriptions emphasise the centrality of family in society, providing this institution with considerable social legitimacy.
We acknowledge the common complementary nature of various corporate governance mechanisms. For example, a sophisticated system of institutional complementarities together with associated institutionalized "pressures" eschewing isomorphic conformity 2 in structure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) further perpetuates incongruities between formal and informal governance frameworks within societies. Complementarities between institutional elements infer that the value of any given institutional element is optimised only in the presence of mutually supportive institutional elements (Millgrom & Roberts, 1994; Aoki, 2001) . Firstly, this underscores the importance of their mutually interdependent reinforcing nature, which in turn facilitates the formation of a wider governance framework. Secondly, it emphasizes the importance of the social context within which the endogenous evolution of institutional framework takes place. This questions the efficacy of transplanting individual institutional elements into a foreign governance framework without adding further supportive institutional elements (Millgrom & Roberts, 1994) and recognizing the considerable time involved in the successful adoption, adaptation and assimilation of transplanted institutional element within foreign societal matrix Kuran, 2009) . When combined with Weberian sociology -where such interdependencies are highlighted in creating institutional tensions through conflicting principles of rationality (Lepsius, 1990 ) -it explains well documented tensions arising from incongruity between formal and informal institutions (see North, 1990 North, , 1994 . It also explains the co-existence of more than one governance framework within a national context (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) , where this institutionalized explanation fits with evidence of a similar co-existence of multiple economic equilibria within African societies in the economics literature (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011) .
The perpetuation of such institutional incongruities at a national level is a function of institutionalized isomorphic pressures driving conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) at both a trans-national as well as national level (Ashworth et al., 2007) . In this way narrow formal institutional frameworks first transplanted during colonial era are subject to a combination of mimetic and coercive isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ) at a trans-national level.
Structural reforms typically take the form of national adoption of "international best practice" -a mimetic pressure -as well as arising from coercive pressures from the receipt of development aid, interaction with international financial institutions (such as the structural adjustment programs of IMF and World Bank), and sovereign trading arrangements 3 . Thus formal institutional frameworks are subject to modernization and reform through institutional complementarities centring on the former colonial metropole. This shapes their path dependent evolution. Furthermore the path dependence explains the infusion of development policies with notions of market-orientated governance at their centre , which has stimulated the establishment of new stock markets or substantial reform of pre-existing ones through eschewing notions of economic deregulation and financial liberalisation . The development emphasises the importance of external capital markets and the primacy of IPO's in terms of it forming a critical juncture in lifecycle of firm with the professionalization of its management and operations (see Brav & Gompers, 2003) .
Institutional complementarities also create a mutually reinforced interdependent governance framework within the informal institutional context. Here collectivist and communitarian values and norms alongside religious institutions emphasise the importance of extended clan and familial kinship affiliation (Khavul et al., 2009) . These values also provide a mutually reinforcing framework emphasising commitment -rather than markets-based notions of short term profit maximisation -and family/clan affiliation. Moral and cognitive legitimacy (Suchman, 1995 , Scott, 1995 accorded to extended social structures, such as clan and familial affiliations, together with institutional complementarities provides a mutually reinforcing governance framework. In this way clan and familial affiliations provide the deeper sociological framework upon which business groups can coalesce and form. We argue the importance of this is twofold. Firstly, it provides an alternative rationale for business group formation -away from the standard institutional voids arguments -where business group formation mirrors clan and familial structures within society.
Secondly, it provides an explanation for the sophisticated and complex network of social interrelationships amongst group constituents that acts to bind the group together as well as to define the socialized managerial coordination of resources (capital, products and labour) within the group structure. This is critical in defining the bounded rationality for group constituents.
Finally, we propose that developing an actor-centred institutional perspective, with its emphasis on the co-existence of multiple governance frameworks, helps to explain the pervasive presence of business groups in both low and high institutional quality environments. This perspective questions the traditional institutional "void" view in which business group formation is based solely on deficiencies in state architecture or institutions. Our view finds support in La Porta et al, (1999) who tie the prevalence of family firms (not necessarily business groups) to weak institutional quality, while Fogel (2006) finds similar evidence in a study of family ownership in the largest business groups across a worldwide sample of 40 countries. This view is also in line with the view of Granovetter (2005) that kinship and other social ties facilitate economic transactions and more generally "…that business groups are networks that facilitate the creation of "trust", which makes up for incomplete contracts and imperfect rule of law" (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007: 348) .
However, this is at odds with anecdotal evidence from across North Africa, and Tunisia and Morocco in particular (Hearn, 2014) . While family-centred business groups are prolific and permeate traditional secular distinctions between public and private economic realms, state institutions have been consistently ranked as the highest quality institutions across Africa and on a par with Western Europe (Transparency International, 2014) . Thus, the case of Africa highlights that the interplay between institutions and the presence of business groups is much more complex and at odds with the view put forth by the existing literature.
To sum up, the institutional explanations behind business group formation are varied and ranging from purely taking advantage of monopolies and imperfect competition to deeper sociological explanations involving religious and cultural norms. We argue that combining the explanations put forward above yield more informed insights than the more static theoretical lenses employed by La Porta et al. (1999) and Fogel (2006) , who merely tie the prevalence of family to paucity in institutional quality.
Private equity ownership retention in business groups
Private equity (PE) can be viewed in terms of two very different constituent types of investor:
formal and informal. The former is characterised by venture capital (VC) while the latter is typified by business angels (BA). We argue that retained PE ownership in IPO firm's constituent to business groups distinguishes it from retained ownership of unaffiliated counterparts. Our view is based on the premise that private equity entities face -as previously stated -two ex-post governance options at IPO: that of intrusive social participation within focal firm's organizational structure associated with retained ownership or a reliance on legally protected and mandated performance-based contracts and covenants. The choice between these two forms of governance is largely determined on the degree of moral hazard -encompassed within transactions costs -associated with the business group entity. This arises from the inherent incompleteness of contracts -in terms of being unable to capture every possible eventuality and human behaviour of actors to contract -justifying the focus on appropriate ex-post governance arrangements (Williamson, 1998 (Williamson, , 2000 .
Business group constituents are able to draw upon extensive internal capital, labour and product markets -that fall under the common management of the entity (usually a family)
controlling the group structure. This places a central emphasis on the socialized inter-relationships within the controlling entity, including levels of familial and religious altruism (Schulze et al., 2003; Randøy & Goel, 2003) , and the social capital within such a network. Furthermore the social relationships -including those of social status -determine the efficiency of internal resource coordination system, the longevity of the investment horizon, and the degree of protection of property rights afforded to outside investors (principals). The social cohesion -often based on altruistic bonds rooted on deeper societal structures such as clan or extended familial allegiancesshapes the bounded rationality of group constituents.
We argue that both BA and VC investors are aware of the risks arising from moral hazardwhere these are encapsulated in the way these investors try to minimize the broader transactions costs. Both kinds of investors are characterised by shorter investment time horizons than the comparable business group -but most importantly their bounded rationality lacks the institutional infusions associated with the cohesive altruistic institutions of the business group. These differences are accentuated by dominant business group controlling entities given their elevated control rights vis-à-vis cash flow rights. The propensity towards opportunistic expropriation is a particular concern in family controlled extended business groups as highlighted for East Asia by Claessens et al. (1999 Claessens et al. ( , 2000 .
The institution-theoretic perspective above motivates us to put forth the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between being a business group constituent IPO firm and post-IPO private equity ownership retention
The moderating impact of institutional quality
We argue that the association between retained ownership by outsider private equity investors and business group constituent firms is moderated by institutional quality. The effect of institutional quality is twofold. Firstly, the elevated quality of impartial state-level architecture provides an alternate mechanism for otherwise disadvantaged minority outside investors in terms of protection of property rights. Outside investors -such as private equity -can adopt legally mandated governance mechanisms through the employment of performance related contracts and covenants.
These are optimal, given the presence of high institutional quality yielding protection and enforcement of property rights.
Secondly, institutional theory yields an explanation regarding engagement of PE in business group constituents at the time of the IPO. While Bruton et al (2010) elaborate on the differences between BA and VC variants of PE, we argue that both are profoundly impacted by elevated institutional quality in emerging economies. Higher institutional quality infers not only the transplantation of the institutional elements of foreign "best practice", but critically also their successful adaptation and assimilation within the indigenous societal matrix. This has two further implications. It infers greater acceptance and understanding of market-orientated governance systems -that are central to development policy -amongst indigenous population, which in turn infers that BA investors are more susceptible to notions of divestment and exit from their early-stage investments. It also means greater resonance -or institutional compatibility -between higher quality impartial state architecture and the market-orientated norms of VC investors, where these are based on those of the globally dominant US VC industry (Bruton et al., 2005) . From this the IPO is seen as divestment or exit event (Bruton et al., 2005) .
In the light of the theory-based arguments outlined above we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The association between private equity ownership post-IPO retention and business groups constituent IPO-firms is negatively moderated by institutional quality
African stock markets, private equity and business groups
In the period 2000 -2014 the numbers of firms undertaking an IPO across Africa are, as shown in Hearn & Piesse, 2013; Hearn, 2014) . A large fraction of these privatizations emanate from smaller fledgling frontier markets, largely established as an outcome of structural adjustment programmes, while a high concentration in Egypt is the result of its transition from socialism (see Hearn, 2014) . Finally, it is notable that -with the exceptions of Mauritius and Nigeria -family-centred business groups proliferate across the North African region.
The number of non-family business group IPOs are minimal compared to their familial counterparts.
These are centred on state -such as Tunisian state absorbing the assets of former premier Ben-Ali and Trabelsi -on quasi-state entities -such as Press Trust group in Malawi which is based on presidency -or individuals with informal groups such as in Botswana.
Insert Table 1 A comparison of the investment profiles of BA, domestic and foreign VC is provided in Table 2 .
Several observations can be made. The first is that syndicate sizes are larger for both foreign and domestic VC than for BA investors. The process of syndication is itself a mechanism for the provision of on-going monitoring and surveillance of investments (reduction of ex-post moral hazard) where multiple private equity entities within a syndicate are able to assess each other's appraisals of the target investee firm (Barry et al., 1990; Sahlman, 1990) . Syndicated VC investments are particularly common in high risk environments (Barry et al, 1990; Lerner, 1994) .
There are noticeably very few exits -with one each for domestic and foreign VC respectively and none for BA. The lack of divestment of holdings at IPO is apparent from the number of IPOs in which the overall level of private equity ownership is unchanged with this being 3 IPOs in case of foreign VC and then 6 IPOs for domestic VC and 7 IPOs for BAs.
In terms of the type of VC activity, foreign VC activities are overwhelmingly dominated by those administered by state and development agencies (72%) with a much lower (8%) proportion administered through commercial banks. Contrastingly, domestic VC activities are largely administered through individual private equity partnerships or agencies operating funds (52.27%) while just below 30% are administered by indigenous state and development agencies. It is notable that the majority of private equity target investments are in North as opposed to Sub Saharan Africa.
This reflects the relative economic prosperity and levels of institutional development in Northern
Africa. This is also reflected in the significant target industry concentrations of private equity investment which justifies our later employment of industry controls.
Insert Table 2
When analysing all three classes of private equity activity across Africa, we found that the majority of foreign VC activity arising from international development agencies such as IFC and their major OECD national counterparts such as France's Proparco, UK's CDC, and Netherlands FMO. Ghana. Nigeria was also included but only data between January 2002 and January 2014 was available. Our primary source was here the national stock exchanges and their associated websites and these were cross checked with lists sourced from major brokerage houses to ensure accuracy in the case of Nigeria and Zambia. This resulted in an "estimated" population of 280 stock listings.
In order make sure our population actually covered IPOs and not private placements, the IPO prospectuses were obtained. IPOs included are offerings that produce genuine diversification of ownership amongst a base of minority shareholders (as opposed to private placements involving the preferential allocation of stock with institutional or corporate block holders in pre-arranged quantities and prices). Equally care was taken to avoid misclassifications with registrations, introductions and seasoned (secondary) offerings as these are often also officially referred to as 
Methodology -variables and models

Dependent variables
We employ a binary dependent variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO firm, post-IPO, is constituent to a business group and 0 otherwise. Characterisation of IPO firms in being constituent to business groups was made through detailed analysis of individual listings prospectuses as well as the body of locally accumulated background information and sources outlined in Appendix Table 1 . 6 Our use of such binary dummy variables follows research by Andersen et al (2003) where similar variables were employed to capture familial involvement in firms. A serious shortcoming in relying on formal ownership thresholds to define family involvement in firms "…is that some families are able to exert control with minimal fractional ownership, while others require larger stakes for the same level of control due to differences in firm size, industry, business practices, and product placement" (Andersen et al., 2003: 269) The employment of both formal (through "vertical" pyramidal and "horizontal" cross shareholdings) and informal (socialization) group mechanisms in achieving consensus in our definitions also circumvents thorny issues in literature regarding the formal definition of family firms in particular where this is commonly based on a minimum ownership threshold. It also facilitates the tracing of more informal business groups too. The complexity of analysing business group structure is exemplified in Figure 1 . However it is notable that there is a particularly high concentration of Benjelloun family members across boards of subordinate firms -engendering strong control through informal or "soft" means.
Insert Figure 1
It is also evident that the VC component of private equity investment across group-constituent firms emanates from two sources. As earlier mentioned, these are foreign sources -primarily sovereign governments and development agencies -and within-group sources, where two VC entities, ATTICA and AGORA 7 have already been absorbed into the business group.
Explanatory variables
We designate private equity retained ownership, the focus of our hypotheses, within the context of its three disaggregated components: namely the percentage level of retained post-IPO ownership by BA, domestic VC and foreign VC private equity investors, respectively. All were sourced from indepth studies of IPO listings prospectuses providing data on pre-and post-IPO ownership structure including equity stakes of all investors. One way to measure the extent of retention is to use the ratio of the shares retained to the shares held before IPO. However, this may distort the hypothesized governance impact of retained equity in mitigating transactions costs since it does not differentiate between investors' absolute shareholdings before and after an IPO. Therefore, we followed previous studies and used the percentage ratio of the total number of ordinary shares a particular early stage investor owned after the IPO to the total number of the firm's shares after the IPO as a driver of incentives and/or entrenchment effects associated with share ownership (Bruton et al., 2010; Brennan & Franks, 1997; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Wright et al., 1997 The identification of BA investors is altogether more complex owing to the inherent lack of transparency in these often extremely informal markets. As such we build our identification in line with that undertaken by Bruton et al. (2010) in their study of UK and France. Consequently we identify BAs through the prospectus as those that had invested in the venture as private individuals apart from those associated with founders, other board members, senior management, or VC. We also supplemented our identification through the extensive use of internet-based access to local indigenous media to provide further verification (see Appendix Table 1 ). The use of local media and business journal is essential in a region with BA markets notoriously informal in nature and with few, if any, organised associations of angel investors.
Moderation variables
We employ one institutionally-based measure, in conjunction with the three categories of private equity retained ownership, to form our moderating variables. This is an aggregate institutional quality measure, formed from equally weighted average of six World Bank governance metrics (Kaufman et al., 2009 ) that themselves have been rebased to a 0 -10 scale (see Liu et al., 2014 for details of institutional moderation using an index). The interactive institutional quality relates to Hypothesis 2.
Control variables
We incorporated six distinct sets of control variables. The first consists of institutional control variables and include a legal origin binary dummy (1/0) accounting for civil code law regime alongside an aggregate institutional quality index, comprised from equally weighted average of six underlying World Governance metrics. The inclusion of this aggregated quality index is necessitated through our interactive analysis using the methodology of Kim et al. (2004) and Liu et al., (2014) .
The second group consists of corporate governance control variables which are necessitated both through executive decision monitoring and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) as well as through a resource dependence need for securing access to information and resources to ensure the survival of firm (Boyd, 1994; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . The latter perspective infers more nonexecutives in relation to their boundary-spanning abilities in providing access to valuable resources for the firm.
Thus, we include controls for board size, in terms of total number of executive and nonexecutive directors, and an outsider nonexecutive ratio, defined as number of outside, independent and unaffiliated nonexecutives to board size.
The third group consists of four firm-specific controls variables. In line with Sanders & Carpenter (1998) and Finkelstein & Boyd (1998) we use the natural logarithm of firm's pre-tax revenues (or sales) as proxy for size assumed to control for the complexity of a given firm's operations and thus mirroring complexity of the task environment which in turn is reflective of information processing requirements of the board. We adopt the accounting return on assets (ROA) 8 as a measure of firm performance in line with Finkelstein & Boyd (1998) and Khanna & Palepu (2000) . We also control for firm age where older firms are anticipated to have larger, more complex operations mirroring more complex task environments. The variable also controls for the "liability of newness" and the considerable information asymmetries generated by a lack of operational and performance history (Arthurs et al., 2008) . Finally, following Andersen et al (2003) we introduce 8 ROA is conventionally defined as ROA = ((Net Income + Interest*(1 -Tax Rate))/ Total Assets) (see Khanna & Palepu, 2000) . However due to significant variation in the data arising from varying reporting standards across Africa with frequent omission of reported interest income and corporate taxation rates from listings prospectuses we use a modified version of this, namely ROA = (Net Income/ Total Assets). However while both measures suffer from business cycle affects and are not forward looking they provide a representative indication of firm performance subject to the data limitations prevalent to emerging economies.
the ratio of debt to equity as a control for financial leverage or gearing 9 . The variable captures the differential use of debt as opposed to equity as a governance mechanism as well as the degree and type of financing corresponding to where the firm is positioned in its lifecycle of development. This control variable is also supposed to capture the institutionalized religious prohibition of interestbased debt instruments, which is prevalent in Islamic shari'ya informal institutions (Kuran, 2004) that typically infuse into familial values and into firms organizational and the impact of this on financial structure and gearing (leverage).
The fourth group encompasses ownership control variables. We account for concentrated shareholdings of aggregate board, corporate block entities, family and state. These are mechanisms by which these entities can exert significant coercive institutional pressures into the firm's organizational structure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 ).
The fifth group contains an IPO specific control variable to account for the demand for equity finance in terms of the demographic marketing of shares offered at IPO to types of investors.
The ratio of shares offered at IPO to foreign investors to total shares issued and outstanding post-IPO provides an indication of the willingness of the groups controlling business group to facilitate the coercive institutional pressures arising from active management processes of foreign investors into the organizational structure.
Finally, we include one Economic control variable -the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. We follow Judge et al (2015) who also undertake a cross-country comparative study and provides a measure of the relative importance of stock market financing in relation to overall size of economy.
Empirical Model
A primary consideration in our choice of empirical model is that of causality arising from endogeneity issues. Endogeneity is a significant concern in relation to the linear unidirectional association and the expected causality between the dependent variables (likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to business group) and the retained ownership by private equity entities (BA, domestic and foreign VC). This renders the simple assumption of linear causality unreliable with Probit or logistic model potentially overestimating the importance of these ownership variables (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003) in explaining the likelihood of the outcome. Consequently we follow Bruton et al. (2010) ……N, y 2i is a 1 x p vector of endogenous variables, x 1i is a 1 x k 1 applied across all models. Industry controls capture diversification differences -a key feature in business groups (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) while year effects relate to variation in institutional development and improvements in regulations, capital market culture, and surveillance environment.
The industry definitions vary across each country (see Khanna & Rivkin, 2001 for details of similar 10 If dummy variables for all country (and time) categories were included, their sum would equal 1 for all observations, which is identical to and hence perfectly correlated with the vector-of-ones variable whose coefficient is the constant term; if the vector-of-ones variable were also present, this would result in perfect multicollinearity, so that the matrix inversion in the estimation algorithm would be impossible. This is referred to as the dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2009) issues in a comparable study of 14 emerging economies) leading us to adopt Bloomberg basic industry definitions -which equate to 2-digit SIC classifications 11 .
The test of our second hypothesis considers the moderating impact of institutional quality on the association between retained ownership and the dependent variable of business group affiliation.
The test involves six preliminary OLS regressions with dependent in each case being each of the three private equity retained ownership and then a further three interactive variables formed from each of the three private equity ownership categories moderated by institutional quality. Instruments are again the three respective numbers of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC but in this second set of models these are additionally moderated by institutional quality -giving rise to six instruments (the three underlying private equity counts on top of three more variables formed from the moderation of these with institutional quality). As with our first set these first regressions form the conditional parameters in second stage IV-Probit model. Here again the dependent variable is the binary (1/0) likelihood of whether IPO firm is constituent to business group.
Empirical results
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
The correlation patterns outlined in Table 3 indicate no multi-collinearity problems. These are also confirmed by the unproblematic variance inflation factors (not reported). Furthermore, the correlations between the instruments (numbers of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC) and the dependent variables are both small in absolute value and either lacking or at best with minimal statistical significance, whereas the correlations between the instruments and the potentially endogenous explanatory variables (i.e. ownership of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC) are strongly significant (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003) . Following Bruton et al (2010) our choice of instruments 11 Industry classifications are: Basic Materials; Consumer Goods Non-Cyclical; Consumer Goods Cyclical; Energy; Financials; Health; Industrials; Technology; Telecommunications; Utilities. The identification of firms according to their industry using broad Bloomberg definitions is in keeping with data limitations across our sample, which is a prevalent characteristic of emerging economies.
to account for endogeneity is supported by their high correlation with each of the respective private equity categories of retained ownership while they have minimal correlation with all other variables.
Insert Table 3
Table 4 provides the results of the hypothesis tests as the result from the second stage of the IVProbit models 12 . The empirical evidence broadly supports both our proposed hypotheses. We observe a positive association with all categories of private equity retained ownership and the likelihood of an IPO firm being constitute to a business group, as proposed in Hypothesis 1 (see Table 4 , models 1 and 2). Furthermore this association is negatively moderated by institutional quality, as proposed in Hypothesis 2 (see Table 4 , models 3 and 4), although there is a lack of statistical significance in the sole case of domestic VC.
In terms of controls and the likelihood of an IPO firm being constituent to a business group, we find an association with weaker institutional environments (p ≤ 0.05), fewer nonexecutives being comprised of independent outsiders (p ≤ 0.10), larger firms with more complex operations (in terms of natural log of revenues) (p ≤ 0.05), and younger firms (p ≤ 0.05). The dependent variable is also associated with much higher ownership by family members (p ≤ 0.005). Finally we find a weak association between dependent variable and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (p ≤ 0.01).
Finally, the Wald tests for exogeneity across all models are large suggesting our models are robust. The underlying model (models 1 and 2) only testing the association between retained ownership of private equity and dependent variable have Wald statistics of 45.49 (p ≤ 0.05) and 61.08 (p ≤ 0.05) with respect to a χ 2 distribution while that for the moderating models (models 3 and 4) have Wald statistics of 46.36 (p ≤ 0.05) and 44.58 (p ≤ 0.10). This provides further statistical support for our choice of instruments -with these being the respective numbers of each category of private equity, namely BA, domestic and foreign VC. The Wald statistic for overall model too is 12 The results from the first preliminary OLS steps are available from authors upon request large and statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) inferring the null hypothesis of all coefficient parameters being jointly equal to zero is clearly rejected.
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Finally, using the model parameters we input a range of values for private equity retained ownership post-IPO and institutional quality to produce a 3-dimensional probability surface with respect to likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to a business group. This is outlined in Figure 2 .
Here there is a particularly pronounced increase in statistical likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to a business group in the context of lower institutional quality and increasing private equity retained ownership.
Insert Figure 2 7. Discussion and conclusions
Implications and Contributions
Using a comprehensive sample of 202 IPO's undertaken across Africa between January 2000 and January 2014, we find evidence that a combination of institutional quality and the post-IPO retained ownership explain whether or not IPO firms are constituent to business groups. The retained ownership of private equity constitutes a corporate governance mechanism centered on intrusive and/or close relationship with the investee firm post-IPO. This investor-investee relationship typically includes board participation, voting control and frequent meetings with executives. The alternative is a divestment or an exit from focal firm at IPO and the use of legally mandated performance covenants and contractual terms. We argue that private equity retain a higher ownership share post-IPO in business group constituent firms owing to substantial transactions costs arising from differences in the bounded rationality of the two entities. These transaction costs arise from the institutional environment shaping private equity managers and separately the institutional fabric underlying group formation and cohesion. The transactions costs are conceptually closely related to moral hazard costs associated with traditional agency theory (e.g. Williamson, 1998 Williamson, , 2000 . Furthermore, we find that post-IPO involvement by private equity investee firms is negatively moderated by institutional quality in general. These findings contradict the common agency theory driven arguments (e.g. Bruton et al., 2010) , and highlight how the conduct of African business is more in line with the socially contextualized actor-centered institutional perspective developed in Section 2.
Following Bruton et al (2010) we empirically differentiate between BA and VC investors.
The former being "informal" and investing their own capital -often with a background as successful entrepreneurs themselves -while the latter are "formal" and either investing funds raised from their own external investors or on behalf of commercial bank or sovereign development agency. We also follow Bruton et al (2005) in further differentiating between "foreign" and "domestic" VC with this distinction centring on the degree to which entities are inextricably socially embedded within the indigenous political economy. In particular we argue that despite these differences between BA and VC and separately between foreign and domestic VC -as highlighted in Bruton et al (2010) 's comparative study of UK and French IPO firms, that all private equity investors are faced with the same risks in engaging with business group constituents. This communality between all three categories of private equity in terms of risk -are reflected in differences in bounded rationality of all three private equity on the one hand and business groups on the other. In particular private equity generally lack the deeper sociologically-rooted cohesive institutional framework -often based on a combination of familial and clan altruism -that is so ubiquitous to business groups. This is a particularly important issue given the highly socialized nature of the extended managerial resource coordination system that forms the basis for internal capital, product and labour markets within business groups -where these are viewed as a central strategic advantage under "institutional voids" arguments rationalizing their formation (see Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) . We argue that this socialized coordination mechanism is a reflection of deeper sociological structures within the indigenous societal matrix necessitating an intrusive social presence inferred by higher retained ownership by private equity in order to mitigate informational asymmetries and transactions costs associated with moral hazard.
The developed actor-centered institutional perspective builds on the premise that enhanced formal institutions arise from a combination of coercive and mimetic pressures that seeks to instigate public sector (state) reform. In the African context such pressures have led to the establishment of new stock markets, more corporate transparency and other economic reforms (Ashworth et al., 2007) . However, this wholesale transplantation of economic policies infers a lack of cognitive legitimacy with deeper societal and culturally-based organizational forms -such as indigenous business groups. In line with past research, we argue that African business groups evolve in relation to deeper sociological issues within society, specifically benefitting from the property rights protection and enforcement bestowed on constituent members from the group structure. Thus, business groups in Africa in effect create a form of "sub-state" hybrid governance organization that often exists in tandem with well-designed and functioning external state apparatus.
African business groups that are able to draw on their reputational leverage to attract private equity can augment constrained internal capital markets with additional infusions of capital.
However our findings reveal that higher institutional quality is associated with universal divestment or reduction of ownership by all categories of private equity -with the sole exception of domestic VC. This latter finding is likely the result of private equity being closely tied to indigenous state legal and financial architecture -largely influenced or controlled by extended clans and family groups that also form the basis of business groups themselves. Higher institutional quality infers greater assimilation of formal institutions within the indigenous societal matrix, which in turn facilitates complementarities between these institutions and the US VC industry markets-orientated institutional environment upon which the norms of the global VC industry are based. These norms emphasize the primacy of the IPO in terms of investment exit and divestment. Higher institutional quality is also closely linked to prevalent market-orientated notions of development policy -which shape BA investors preferences towards the risks associated with business group constituents. So these too divest from business group constituent firms at the time of IPO.
To sum up, our empirical findings question the conventional view of organizations as mere "players" within the confines of the "rules of the game" inferred by institutions (Williamson, 1998 (Williamson, , 2000 . What we observe in the interplay between private equity and African business groups, is that group-constituent IPO firms adopt a "sub-state" role in defining property rights. We argue that consideration of the socialized managerial resource coordination mechanism within business groups has been largely overlooked in the emerging market literature to date. This is despite its central importance to the well documented strategic benefits of business groups arising from their internal capital, labor and product markets that is at the core of "institutional voids" arguments regarding their formation.
Limitations and Future Research
While our study is using a multi-country institutional framework and we use an aggregate institutional quality measure based on the six well-known World Bank governance metrics -a more revealing approach would be if disaggregation were possible. Such disaggregation is fraught with issues regarding the independence of the six World Bank governance metrics (see Langbein & Knack, 2010) . One possibility is the employment of a broader range of institutional metrics that could potentially facilitate deeper insights into the exact nature of institutional deficiencies and the rationale for business group formation.
A further limitation arises from our sample formed by IPOs only. While IPO events provide a number of methodological advantages and is a central part of our unique approach, in the sense that such firms are opening their organizational and ownership structures, a broader sample comprised of every listed firm would have been advantageous. Finally we highlight the need for broader cross-country comparative studies in order to further "tease out" the institutional contexts and differences leading to the prevalence of business groups in emerging markets in general, and in Africa in particular. This table reports the Pearson correlations between all variables included in our study. These are the two binary dependent variables, namely adopting value 1 if IPO firm is constituent to family business group and 0 otherwise and similarly adopting value 1 if IPO firm is constituent to non-family business group and 0 otherwise. Explanatory variables are the percentage levels of retained ownership by BA, domestic VC and foreign VC respectively. Institutional controls are legal origin binary dummy (adopting value 1 if civil code law and 0 if common law jurisdiction) and aggregate institutional quality. Corporate governance controls are board size and independent nonexecutive ratio, firm-specific controls are log of firm revenues, ROA, log of firm age and debt-to-equity ratio. Ownership controls are percentage ownership by board, corporate block holders, family and state entities. IPO control is proportion of shares offered to total shares issued. Economic control is ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Finally we include the numbers of BA, domestic VC and foreign VC respectively. This table reports results from the second stage results from two-stage probit regressions for the binary (1/0) likelihood of IPO firm being constituent to a business group onto our explanatory variables, namely the retained ownership of three private equity entities (BA, domestic VC and foreign VC) that are mediated by aggregate institutional quality metrics in turn on top of a range of controls. These being institutional controls, namely legal origin (1 for civil code law and 0 for common law) and aggregate institutional quality, corporate governance controls, namely board size and independent nonexecutive ratio, firm-specific controls, namely log of firm revenues, ROA, log of firm age, and debt-to-equity ratio. The analysis also includes Ownership controls for board ownership, corporate block holder entities, family and state, alongside an IPO control for the issue size in relation to total shares outstanding and an economic control for ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. 
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